Political Economy of Elections
This course covers formal models of elections and political economy, with topics including social choice theory, the median voter theorem, game theory, and models of electoral competition.
Lectures
- 01Course Overview and Decision Theory
- 02Social Choice Theory: Setup and Aggregation Rules
- 03Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
- 04Median Voter Theorem
- 05Static Games and Nash Equilibrium
- 06Game Theory: Continued Examples and Algorithm
- 07Electoral Competition: Office-Motivated Candidates
- 08Electoral Competition: Policy-Motivated Candidates
- 09Electoral Competition: Uncertainty and Polarization
- 10Information Aggregation: Bayesian Updating
- 11Juror's Optimal Action and Following the Signal
- 12Probability of Correct Decision: Single Juror
- 13Condorcet Jury Theorem
- 14From Juries to Elections: Voting Rules and Error Tradeoffs
- 15Strategic Voting and the Swing Voter's Curse
- 16Political Persuasion: Model Setup