Game Theory for political scientists

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- Public policy and political science

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- How are all these things compatible?









Figure:





Майлан Незалежності

Interaction

- Interaction
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- That is, those who always strive to get as much as they can
- and who, consequently, try to get as much as they can from this interaction, given the behaviour of their opponents they can observe, rationalize and predict.

Rationality in economics

- Individuals can order the objects of choice X by preferences, i.e. can always say which of the objects they like more, and which one — less.
 - \square We impose no limits on the ordering of elements of X, nor on the strengths of preferences over them: all that matters is their rank
- In formal terms, rationality means that people typically choose the option which is highest in their subjective order, i.e. does not lose any chance to improve own well-being.
- This setup can have two interpretations
 - $\hfill\square$ Normative: use this rule as instrument to make good decision
 - Positive: model behaviour of a typical individual who may not reason as supposed by the model, but behave as if he does reason in that way (Friedman 1953).

A prototype decision problem

If there is more than one possible outcome, **decision problem** is the task of choosing one *action a* of many possible actions from the set A which, given individual *preferences* \mathcal{P} over possible *outcomes* X, yields the most desirable of these given the circumstances caputred by the *state of the world* S:

$$a^* = \arg \max_{a \in A} X(a, S) | \mathcal{P}$$
 (1)

The decision problem

| | s_1 | <i>s</i> ₂ | | s _n |
|----------------|------------------------|------------------------|---|-----------------|
| a_1 | <i>x</i> ₁₁ | <i>x</i> ₁₂ | | x _{1n} |
| a 2 | <i>x</i> ₂₁ | <i>x</i> ₂₂ | | x _{2n} |
| ÷ | ÷ | ÷ | · | ÷ |
| a _k | x_{k1} | x_{k2} | | x _{kn} |

.

or, more explicitly,

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_1 \\ a_2 \\ \vdots \\ a_k \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_1 & s_2 & \dots & s_n \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} x_{11} & x_{12} & \dots & x_{1n} \\ x_{21} & x_{22} & \dots & x_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ x_{k1} & x_{k2} & \dots & x_{kn} \end{bmatrix}$$

Example

Suppose the set X consists of outcomes: 'healthy' \succ 'unhealthy' \succ 'asthma' \succ 'lung cancer', with preferences decreasing in that order.

Suppose the set S consists of { 'predisp(osition to asthma/cancer)' and 'no predisp(osition to asthma/cancer)' }, and

the set A consists of $\{$ 'smoking' and 'no smoking' $\}$.

A prototype decision problem

| | | predisposed | no predisposition | |
|-----------------------|---|--------------|---|----------------------|
| | smoking | lung cancer | unhealthy | - |
| | no smoking | asthma | healthy | |
| | | | | |
| smoking no smoking | $\begin{bmatrix} \\ \\ \\ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ $ | no predisp] | $\rightarrow \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{lung cancer} \\ \text{asthma} \end{array} \right.$ | unhealthy healthy |

Decision to smoke is irrational as strictly dominated by 'no smoking'; yet it may be rational given 1) your preferences, and 2) the context.

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- In other words, ratioinal decisions are simply best decisions given person's preferences and constraints.
- Economists assume that *almost all* decisions are rational.
- Contrary to what one may think, rationality does not necessarily mean money maximization.
- Yet it applies to *almost every* human decision.

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- Broadly speaking, game theory studies any kind human interactions wherein people's decisions mutually affect opportunities, preferences and/or beliefs of each other.
- In most cases, behaviour is assumed to be *rational* and *strategic*.
- Two major classes of games: *noncooperative* and *cooperative*.

Ransom (1996)



Figure:

http://www.americanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechransom.html

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Course information

- 10 lectures/seminars of 40 contact hours
- Timing: Wednesdays or Mondays?
- Home assignments (2-3).
- Homework (reading! (in English!!)).
- Classwork: discussion and experiments.
- Final exam.

Tentative syllabus

- 1. Rational behaviour and utility theory under certainty, risk and uncertainty.
- 2. Decisions and games
- 3. Static and dynamic games with politics applications.
- 4. Cooperative games.
- 5. Matching and mechanism design.

Suggestions and feedback: welcomed by all communication means (ICEF office 3427, icef-research@hse.ru)